

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia

In South Viet-Nam, we have consistently sought to assure the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own futures free from enemy interference. It would be tragic indeed if we endangered, or even lost, the progress we have achieved by failing to provide the relatively modest but crucial aid which is so badly needed there

The economic and military assistance levels for Cambodia, particularly, are clearly inadequate to meet minimum basic needs. Our support is vital to help effect an early end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement.

President Ford, on signing the Foreign Assistance
Act, December 30, 1974

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ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA AND VIET-NAM

Cambodia

- The need for aid to Cambodia is urgent.
- The current Khmer Communist offensive is forcing government forces to consume military supplies at increased rates.
- The offensive has equally placed additional large burdens on food aid programs by creating thousands of additional refugees and destroying crops.
- Without additional food aid and military supplies, Cambodia will run out of supplies well before the end of this fiscal year and will no longer be able to defend itself effectively.
- The Congress has authorized only \$200 million, plus \$75 million worth of U.S. military stocks,

of the Administration request of \$390 million for military aid.

- Due to these increased Communist pressures, the Administration has now asked the Congress to lift the \$200 million ceiling on military aid and authorize and appropriate an additional \$222 million.
- The Administration also has asked the Congress to eliminate the \$377 million ceiling on overall aid to enable us to supply vital additional supplies of rice to the people.
- The U.S. Government will continue to do all it can to promote an early compromise settlement in Cambodia — something that the Cambodian Government is more than willing to do.

Viet-Nam

- The Administration requested \$1.4 billion for military aid to South Viet-Nam for FY 1975. Congress has authorized \$1 billion but only appropriated \$700 million.
- The Administration is now asking the Congress to appropriate the additional \$300 million that was already authorized to give the South Vietnamese what they need to continue to defend themselves effectively against growing North Vietnamese attacks.
- The South Vietnamese Government's efforts to achieve a political settlement in South Viet-Nam, as provided for in the Paris agreement, cannot prosper when South Viet-Nam is faced by

shortages of essential supplies so that the other side is encouraged to heighten its military pressure.

- Without additional aid—largely for military consumables such as ammunition, gasoline, and medical supplies—South Viet-Nam's military position is likely to be significantly eroded by the end of the current dry season in April or May.
- All that we desire is to maintain South Viet-Nam's capabilities to defend itself.
- This supplemental request for the \$300 million already authorized will give them that chance and help promote compliance with the Paris peace agreement.

The sums currently requested are needed to continue promoting our objective of a peaceful, stable Southeast Asia. They are both within our means and are worth the cost.

NBC NEWS PROGRAM: "CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT FORD," JANUARY 23, 1975 (EXCERPT)

MR. BROKAW. Mr. President, what are our objectives now in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, particularly.

THE PRESIDENT. Vietnam, after all the lives that were lost there, Americans, over 50,000, and after the tremendous expenditures that we made in American dollars, several years, more than \$30 billion a year—it seems to me that we ought to try and give the South Vietnamese the opportunity through military assistance to protect their way of life.

This is what we have done traditionally as Americans. Certainly, since the end of World War II we have helped innumerable nations in military arms and economic assistance to help themselves to maintain their own freedom.

The American people believe, I think, historically, that if a country and a people want to protect their way of life against aggression, we will help them in a humanitarian way and in a military way with arms and funds if they are willing to fight for themselves. This is within our tradition as Americans.

And the South Vietnamese apparently do wish to maintain their national integrity and their independence. I think it is in our best tradition as Americans to help them at the present time.

MR. BROKAW. How much longer and how deep does our commitment go to the South Vietnamese?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think there is any long-term commitment. As a matter of fact, the American Ambassador there, Graham Martin, has told me, as well as Dr. Kissinger, that he thinks if adequate dollars which are translated into arms and economic aid—if that was made available that within 2 or 3 years the South Vietnamese would be over the hump militarily as well as economically.

Now I am sure we have been told that before, but they had made substantial progress until they began to run a little short of ammunition, until inflation started in the last few months to accelerate.

I happen to think that Graham Martin, who is a very hardnosed, very dedicated man, and very realistic, is right. And I hope the Congress will go along with this extra supplemental that I am asking for to help the South Vietnamese protect themselves.

MR. CHANCELLOR. Sir, that is \$300 million you have asked for the South Vietnamese. And given what you have just said—well, I am just going to phrase it this way—will we see the light at the end of the tunnel if we give them \$300 million?

THE PRESIDENT. The best estimates of the experts that are out there, both military and civilian, tell me that \$300 million in this fiscal year is the minimum. A year ago when the budget was submitted for military assistance for South Vietnam, it was \$1,400 million. Congress cut it in half, which meant that South Vietnamese rangers going out on patrol instead of having an adequate supply of hand grenades and weapons were cut in half, which, of course, has undercut their military capability and has made them conserve and not be as strong.

Now, \$300 million doesn't take them back up to where they were or where it was proposed they should be. But the experts say, who are on the scene, who have seen the fighting and have looked at the stocks and the reserves, tell me that that would be adequate for the current circumstances.

MR. CHANCELLOR. Mr. President, does it make you uneasy to sit on that couch in this room and have experts in Vietnam saying only a little bit more and it will be all right? We did hear that for so many years.

THE PRESIDENT. I think you have to think pretty hard about it, but a lot of skeptics, John, said that the money we were going to make available for the rehabilitation of Europe after World War II wouldn't do any good, and, of course, the investment we made did pay off.

A lot of people have said the money that we made available to Israel wouldn't be helpful in bringing about the peace that has been achieved there for the last year and a half or so, but it did. It helped.

I think an investment of \$300 million at this time in South Vietnam could very likely be a key for the preservation of their freedom and might conceivably force the North Vietnamese to stop violating the Paris accords of January 1973.

When you look at the agreement that was signed—and I happened to be there at the time of the signing in January of 1973—the North Vietnamese agreed not to infiltrate. The facts are they have infiltrated with countless thousands—I think close to 100,000 from North Vietnam down to South Vietnam. They are attacking cities, metropolitan areas. They have refused to permit us to do anything about our U.S. missing in action in North Vietnam. They have refused to negotiate any political settlement between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. They have called off the meetings either in Paris or in Saigon.

So here is a country—South Vietnam—that is faced with an attitude on the part of the North Vietnamese of total disregard of the agreement that was signed about 2 years ago. I think the South Vietnamese deserve some help in this crisis.

**PRESS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY OF
STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER, JANUARY
28, 1975 (EXCERPTS)**

Q: Mr. Secretary, Senator Robert Byrd said this morning the leaders of both parties in Congress have told President Ford that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get more aid to South Viet-Nam. Where does that leave the situation?

A: Well, let us make clear what it is we have asked for. And let me express the hope that what we are asking for doesn't rekindle the entire debate on Viet-Nam, because that is emphatically not involved.

Last year the Administration asked for \$1.4 billion for military aid to Viet-Nam. The Congress authorized \$1 billion. It appropriated \$700 million. We are asking the Congress to appropriate the \$300 million difference between what it had already authorized and what it actually appropriated in the light of the stepped-up military operations in Viet-Nam.

This is not an issue of principle of whether or not we should be in Viet-Nam. The issue is whether any case at all can be made for giving inadequate aid to Viet-Nam. And we believe there can be no case for a deliberate decision to give less than the adequate aid, and aid that the Congress had already authorized to be given, so that it could not have been even an issue of principle for the Congress.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you give us your assessment of the situation in Indochina, particularly Viet-Nam, two years after the agreement which you labored over, and what went wrong?

A: I think if you remember the intense discussions that were going on in the United States during the negotiation of the agreement, you will recall that the overwhelming objective that was attempted to be served was to disengage American military forces from Indochina and to return our prisoners from North Viet-Nam.

Under the conditions that we then confronted—which was an increasing domestic debate on this issue—those were the principal objectives that could be achieved. The alternative—namely, to impose a different kind of solution—would have required a more prolonged military operation by the United States.

Secondly, what has gone wrong, if anything has gone wrong, is that it was the belief of those who signed the agreement—certainly a belief that was encouraged by the United States, as well as by the public debate here—that the objection in the United States was not to our supporting a government that was trying to defend itself by its own efforts. Our national objection was to the presence of American forces in Viet-Nam.

Now, the military situation in Viet-Nam was reasonably good until last June. At that point, we had to impose cuts—no new equipment could be sent, and only inadequate ammunition. This brought about a reduction in the ammunition expenditure by the Vietnamese Army. This in turn led to an increase in casualties, to a loss of mobility, and therefore to a deterioration in the military situation.

All that we have ever said was that the settlement would put South Viet-Nam in a position where it had a chance to defend itself. That chance exists. That chance depends on adequate American assistance. And that is the chance we are asking for.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPECIAL REPORT
NO. 14, "VIET-NAM: JANUARY 1975"
(EXCERPTS)**

On January 27, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam was signed in Paris. We achieved a settlement which permitted the disengagement of American forces, which left the resolution of the political future of Viet-Nam to be negotiated among the Vietnamese parties, and which returned American

prisoners to their homes. We made clear our intention to end our remaining involvement in Viet-Nam as quickly as circumstances would permit.

... It was our hope that the agreement would ... provide a framework within which the Vietnamese could make their own political choices and resolve their own problems in an atmosphere of peace. Unfortunately this hope—a hope which was shared by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the South Vietnamese people—has been frustrated by

the actions of North Viet-Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. In clear violation of the agreement, they have:

- Infiltrated over 170,000 North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam and built up their main-force army in the South from about 220,000 at the time of the agreement to 300,000 now (of which 225,000 are North Vietnamese);
- Tripled the strength of their armor in the South by sending in over 400 new vehicles and increased the number of their artillery and antiaircraft weapons as well;
- Improved their military logistics system running through Laos, Cambodia (Khmer Republic), and the Demilitarized Zone as well as within South Viet-Nam, and expanded their armament stockpiles;
- Refused to deploy the teams which under the agreement were to oversee the cease-fire;
- Refused to pay their prescribed share of the expenses of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS);
- Failed to honor their commitment to cooperate in resolving the status of American and other personnel missing in action even breaking off all discussions on this matter by refusing for the past 7 months to meet with U.S. and Republic of Viet-Nam representatives in the Four-Party Joint Military Team;
- Broken off all negotiations with the Republic of Viet-Nam, including the political negotiations in Paris and the Two Party Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon, and answered the Republic of Viet-Nam's repeated calls for unconditional resumption of the negotiations with unreasonable demands for the overthrow of the Government as a precondition for any renewed talks; and
- Steadily increased their military pressure, overrunning several areas, including 11 district towns, which were clearly and unequivocally held by the Republic of Viet-Nam at the time of the cease-fire. Their latest and most serious escalation of the fighting began in early December 1974 with offensives in the southern half of South Viet-Nam and included the conquest of Phuoc Long Province and its capital, Song Be.

The record of American and South Vietnamese compliance presents a sharp contrast.

All American military forces and advisers were withdrawn 60 days after the signing of the agreement. . . .

U.S. military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam has not even approached the one-for-one, piece-for-piece replacement level authorized by the agreement, while Russian and Chinese military aid to North Viet-Nam has remained at roughly the same level for the past 5 years (except for very large deliveries in 1972, the major invasion year) and has permitted a major buildup of North Vietnamese inventories in the South since the agreement.

Since the agreement does not impose a unilateral ceasefire on the South Vietnamese Government, the Republic of Viet-Nam has taken military measures to defend its people and its territory. However:

- South Vietnamese forces are on the military defensive. They are not fighting in North Viet-Nam or trying to overthrow its Government or political system.
- The Government has not increased the size of its armed forces.
- It has cooperated fully with the International Commission of Control and Supervision and paid its share of the commission's expenses.
- It has called for unconditional resumption of the negotiations with the Democratic Republic of (North) Viet-Nam and with the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
- It has proposed plans for a political settlement including internationally supervised elections on a specified date.

. . . it is the North Vietnamese who are responsible for the breakdown of negotiations and the continuation of the war. The only kind of peace which North Viet-Nam is seeking is a peace imposed by force of arms.

This is not the kind of peace envisaged in the Paris agreement.

It is not the kind of peace for which we and the South Vietnamese people have struggled so long.

It is not the kind of peace which is consistent with the principles for which this country stands.

South Viet-Nam has excellent long-range

potential. Its armed forces have demonstrated their ability to defend the country against North Vietnamese military pressure and can continue doing so with adequate logistical support. Its natural resources, including a skilled population, rich agricultural land and fishing grounds, and particularly the recent discovery of oil provide a solid base for rapid economic development similar to other countries of the area.

We believe that South Viet-Nam has the potential to become economically viable and militarily capable of defending itself. We believe it should be free to choose its own political system and leaders as envisaged in the Paris agreement, and able to work out its own long-range accommodation with the North. We believe our objectives in South Viet-Nam would then be accomplished.

PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 28, 1975 PROPOSING ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIET-NAM

Two years ago the Paris Agreement was signed, and several weeks later was endorsed by major nations including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. We had succeeded in negotiating an Agreement that provided the framework for lasting peace in Southeast Asia. This Agreement would have worked had Hanoi matched our side's efforts to implement it. Unfortunately, the other side has chosen to violate most of the major provisions of this Accord.

The South Vietnamese and Cambodians are fighting hard in their own defense, as recent casualty figures clearly demonstrate. With adequate U.S. material assistance, they can hold their own. We cannot turn our backs on these embattled countries. U.S. unwillingness to provide adequate assistance to allies fighting for their lives would seriously affect our credibility throughout the world as an ally. And this credibility is essential to our national security.

Viet-Nam

When the Paris Agreement was signed, all Americans hoped that it would provide a framework under which the Vietnamese people could make their own political choices and resolve their own problems in an atmosphere of peace.

In compliance with that Agreement, the United States withdrew its forces and its military advisors from Vietnam. In further compliance with the Agreement, the Republic of Vietnam offered a comprehensive political program designed to reconcile the differences between the South Vietnamese parties and to lead to free and supervised elections throughout all of South Vietnam. The Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly reiterated this offer and has several times proposed a specific date for a free election open to all South Vietnamese political groups.

Unfortunately, our hopes for peace and for reconciliation have been frustrated by the persistent refusal of the

other side to abide by even the most fundamental provisions of the Agreement. North Vietnam has sent its forces into the South in such large numbers that its army in South Vietnam is now greater than ever, close to 289,000 troops. Hanoi has sent tanks, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons to South Vietnam by the hundreds. These troops and equipment are in South Vietnam for only one reason—to forcibly impose the will of Hanoi on the South Vietnamese people. Moreover, Hanoi has refused to give a full accounting for our men missing in action in Vietnam.

The Communists have also violated the political provisions of the Paris Agreement. They have refused all South Vietnamese offers to set a specific date for free elections, and have now broken off negotiations with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. In fact, they say that they will not negotiate with that Government as it is presently constituted, although they had committed themselves to do so.

Recent events have made it clear that North Vietnam is again trying to impose a solution by force. Earlier this month, North Vietnamese forces captured an entire province, the population centers of which were clearly under the control of the South Vietnamese Government when the Paris Agreement was signed. Our intelligence indicates, moreover, that their campaign will intensify further in coming months.

At a time when the North Vietnamese have been building up their forces and pressing their attacks, U.S. military aid to the South Vietnamese Government has not been sufficient to permit one-to-one replacement of equipment and supplies used up or destroyed, as permitted by the Paris Agreement. In fact, with the \$700 million appropriation available in the current fiscal year, we have been able to provide no new tanks, airplanes, trucks, artillery pieces, or other major equipment, but only essential consumable items such as ammunition, gasoline, spare parts, and medical supplies. And in the face of the increased North Vietnamese pressure of recent months, these supplies have not kept pace with minimally essential expenditure. Stockpiles have been drawn down and will soon reach dangerously low levels.

Last year, some believed that cutting back our military assistance to the South Vietnamese Government would induce negotiations for a political settlement. Instead, the opposite has happened. North Vietnam is refusing negotiations and is increasing its military pressure.

I am gravely concerned about this situation. I am concerned because it poses a serious threat to the chances for political stability in Southeast Asia and to the progress that has been made in removing Vietnam as a major issue of contention between the great powers.

I am also concerned because what happens in Vietnam can affect the rest of the world. It cannot be in the interests of the United States to let other nations believe that we are prepared to look the other way when agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated are contemptuously violated. It cannot be in our interest to cause our friends all over the world to wonder whether we will support them if they comply with agreements that others violate.

When the United States signed the Paris Agreement, as when we pursued the policy of Vietnamization, we told the South Vietnamese, in effect, that we would not defend them with our military forces, but that we would provide them the means to defend themselves, as permitted by the Agreement. The South Vietnamese have performed effectively in accepting this challenge. They have demonstrated their determination and ability to defend themselves if they are provided the necessary military materiel with which to do so. We, however, may be judged remiss in keeping our end of the bargain.

We—the Executive and Legislative Branches together—must meet our responsibilities. As I have said earlier, the amount of assistance appropriated by the previous Congress is inadequate to the requirements of the situation.

I am, therefore, proposing:

—A supplemental appropriation of \$300 million for military assistance to South Vietnam.

The \$300 million in supplemental military assistance that I am requesting for South Vietnam represents the difference between the \$1 billion which was authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1975 and the \$700 million which has been appropriated. This amount does not meet all the needs of the South Vietnamese army in its defense against North Vietnam. It does not, for example, allow for replacement of equipment lost in combat. It is the minimum needed to prevent serious reversals by providing the South Vietnamese with the urgent supplies required for their self-defense against the current level of North Vietnamese attacks.

I believe that this additional aid will help to deter the North Vietnamese from further escalating their military pressure and provide them additional incentive to resume

the political discussions envisaged under the Paris Agreement.

All Americans want to end the U.S. role in Vietnam. So do I. I believe, however, that we must end it in a way that will enhance the chances of world peace and sustain the purposes for which we have sacrificed so much.

Cambodia

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore peace and to allow the Khmer people an opportunity to decide freely who will govern them. To this end, our immediate goal in Cambodia is to facilitate an early negotiated settlement. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly called for talks without preconditions with the other Khmer parties. We have fully supported these proposals as well as the resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly calling for early negotiations among Khmer parties.

Regrettably, there has been no progress. In fact, the Communists have intensified hostilities by attacking on the outskirts of Phnom Penh and attempting to cut the land and water routes to the capital. We must continue to aid the Cambodian Government in the face of externally supported military attacks. To refuse to provide the assistance needed would threaten the survival of the Khmer Republic and undermine the chances for peace and stability in the area.

The Cambodian Government forces, given adequate assistance, can hold their own. Once the insurgents realize that they cannot win by force of arms, I believe they will look to negotiations rather than war.

I am, therefore, proposing:

—Legislation to eliminate the current ceilings on military and economic assistance to Cambodia, and to authorize the appropriation of an additional \$222 million for military aid for Cambodia, and

—An amendment to the fiscal year 1975 budget for the additional \$222 million.

To provide the assistance necessary, the present restrictions on our military and economic aid to Cambodia must be removed and additional money provided. The \$200 million in military assistance currently authorized was largely expended during the past six months in response to the significantly intensified enemy offensive action. In addition, I have utilized the \$75 million drawdown of Department of Defense stocks authorized by Congress for this emergency situation. Since the beginning of the Communist offensive on January 1, ammunition expenditures have risen and will exhaust all available funds well before the end of this fiscal year. To meet minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, I am requesting an additional \$222 million in military assistance and the elimination of the present \$200 million ceiling on military assistance to Cambodia. I am also requesting elimination

of the \$377 million ceiling on overall assistance to Cambodia. This is necessary to enable us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, under the Food for Peace program, to assure adequate food for the victims of war and to prevent the economic collapse of the country.

I know we all seek the same goals for Cambodia—a situation wherein the suffering and destruction has stopped and the Khmer people have the necessary security to rebuild their society and their country. These goals are attainable. With the minimal resources and flexibility I

am requesting from you, the Congress, we can help the people of Cambodia to have a choice in determining their future. The consequences of refusing them this assistance will reach far beyond Cambodia's borders and impact severely on prospects for peace and stability in that region and the world. There is no question but that this assistance would serve the interests of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD

The White House,
January 28, 1975.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR CAMBODIA

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip C. Habib, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee February 3, 1975

In both Viet-Nam and Cambodia there has been a recent significant escalation of military action by Communist forces. This has placed new and severe strains on the resources of the governments of those countries and has rendered the assistance we provide to them inadequate to meet its intended objectives. The President has therefore asked Congress to make available additional funds for military aid to Viet-Nam and Cambodia and to remove impediments to the use of funds already appropriated to provide essential food aid to Cambodia.

The Viet-Nam supplemental, a Defense appropriation, will be formally considered on another occasion. The authority to increase food aid for Cambodia does not require any additional appropriation. My testimony today therefore is primarily in support of our request for appropriations for military aid for Cambodia. But in my remarks this afternoon I will attempt to address the problem of Cambodia in the broader context of our overall Indochina policy.

Two years ago we concluded an agreement in Paris which we hoped would end the war in Viet-Nam and pave the way for settlements in Laos and Cambodia. The Paris agreement was the end result of a long and tortuous negotiating process. In its final form, the agreement was one which we felt honored the sacrifices and respected the sense of justice of both sides. It implied a rejection of absolutes, an acceptance of restraint, an acknowledgment of limitations—as must any

accord. From the standpoint of the United States, the agreement in large measure met what had been our purpose throughout the long history of our efforts in Viet-Nam: it ended our direct military involvement there and established a formula through which the people of South Viet-Nam could determine their political future without outside interference.

Things have not worked out as we had hoped. Only in Laos have the contending parties moved from military confrontation to political competition. In Viet-Nam, after a period of relative quiescence warfare again rages and the structure created by the agreement for working toward a political settlement is endangered. In Cambodia, there has been no amelioration of the conflict, and the military balance in that country is gravely threatened. I cannot profess surprise at these developments. The Paris agreement contained no self-enforcing mechanisms. For that agreement to be effective and to achieve its purpose, both sides were required to act in accordance with the principles of restraint, compromise, and minimal good faith which must underlie the resolution of any indecisive conflict. Those qualities have been conspicuously absent from Hanoi's approach. In Cambodia also, a negotiated settlement demands that both sides accept the imperatives of compromise. The Cambodian Communists have instead sought military victory.

While its focus was on Viet-Nam, the Paris agreement also contained provisions relating to Laos and Cambodia. The signatories were enjoined to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries, and all foreign troops were to have been withdrawn. South Viet-Nam and the United States have abided by those strictures. Hanoi has not. North Viet-Nam continues to use the territory of Laos to send forces and war materiel to South Viet-Nam and continues to station troops in remote areas of that

country. North Viet-Nam uses the territory of Cambodia to support its military operations in South Viet-Nam. In addition, Hanoi gives material assistance and battlefield advice to Communist forces operating against the Cambodian Government.

Let me now turn specifically to the situation in Cambodia. The conflict in Cambodia is complex, and its origins are widely misunderstood. Sihanouk was deposed in 1970 by a government which he himself had formed less than a year before. That action was ratified by a National Assembly whose members Sihanouk had personally selected. The United States played no role in the matter. (Our total presence in Cambodia at that time consisted of two diplomatic officers and three military attaches.) Several days after those events, North Vietnamese forces attacked Cambodian Government outposts in the eastern region of the country. Armed hostilities in Cambodia date from those attacks. Under North Vietnamese auspices, insurgent forces were formed and joined the fray.

Warfare has since been unremitting, and often intense. The human and material cost has been high. The economic life of Cambodia has been shattered. What was once a rich agricultural country producing consistent rice surpluses is now heavily dependent on outside assistance for even the most basic necessities. Perhaps as many as 1.5 million people, over a fifth of the total population, have become refugees. Thousands of Cambodians—soldiers and civilians—have lost their lives.

Cambodia's battle against an externally supported insurgent movement has been intensified still further in recent weeks. On January 1, Communist forces launched a new offensive, stepping up attacks in the area near Phnom Penh and against several provincial capitals and making strong efforts to cut the vital Mekong supply corridor. Total casualties for both sides are running at least 1,000 a day—killed, wounded, or missing—and more than 60,000 new refugees have been created. The already stricken economic life of the country is further ravaged.

Cambodian Government forces have fought remarkably well in the face of difficult odds. In little more than 4 years, a small and largely ceremonial army has grown into a sizable and increasingly effective fighting force. In this connection, I have seen a number of recent press articles alleging waste of ammunition by Cambodian forces. They require comment. While this

was partly true a year ago, as noted by the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance in a recent report, that report also notes that steps have been taken to improve ammunition conservation. Because of those efforts, Cambodian forces are undoubtedly making better use of their ammunition this year than last. But combat intensity remains the primary determinant of ammunition expenditure—and the Communists have raised the intensity markedly since January 1. I would also add that it is misleading to compare the ammunition expenditures of defending forces with those of insurgents. As in Viet-Nam, Communist forces—having no population centers or fixed positions to defend—are able to mass forces at times and places of their choosing; this allows them economies unavailable to widely dispersed defenders.

In Cambodia, even more than in Viet-Nam, the material resources the nation must have for its defense are strained to the limit. If South Viet-Nam faces a harsh choice in allocating diminishing defense resources, it is not inaccurate to say that Cambodia has no choice. If it is to avoid collapse and chaos, and if there is to be any prospect for a compromise solution, additional aid must be provided without delay.

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore peace and to allow the Cambodian people an opportunity to decide freely the political future of their country. It has never been our belief, or a premise of our policy toward Cambodia, that the conflict would end in conclusive military victory by Cambodian Government forces. Nor, however, should it end in military victory by the Communists. We believe the only logical and fair solution is one involving negotiations and a compromise settlement. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly called for talks with the opposing side, without preconditions. We have fully supported these proposals as well as the resolution, sponsored by Cambodia's Southeast Asian neighbors and adopted in the last session of the U.N. General Assembly, calling for early negotiations. The Communists, however, have been adamantly opposed to a negotiated settlement. Their attitude is unlikely to change unless and until they conclude that military victory is not possible. The first imperative, therefore, and the aim of our military assistance to the Cambodian Government, is to preserve a military balance and thereby to promote negotiations.

Present restrictions on our military and economic assistance to Cambodia, contained in the 1974

amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, make it impossible to accomplish that goal. The Administration originally requested \$390 million in military aid for this fiscal year. The \$200 million in military aid authorized for this fiscal year was expended during the past 6 months, on the basis of continuing-resolution authority, in response to significantly intensified Communist offensive actions. Since the beginning of the latest Communist offensive on January 1, ammunition expenditures have gone higher, of necessity, and even the \$75 million drawdown of Defense Department stocks authorized for this emergency situation will not meet the needs. In addition to this stringent situation with respect to military supplies, Cambodia also faces an impending severe rice shortage.

Therefore, to meet minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, President Ford has asked the Congress to do three things:

- First, to eliminate the existing \$200 million ceiling on military assistance for Cambodia.
- Second, to authorize and appropriate \$222 million in military aid, in addition to appropriating the \$200 million currently authorized. Our original request to the Congress for military assistance to Cambodia during the current fiscal year, \$390 million, was an amount we regarded then as the minimum needed. With unexpectedly increased Communist pressures, and in view of the sharp rise in the cost of ammunition—the largest single item in the program—\$222 million in additional funds is now clearly required. That amount, plus the \$200 million in aid funds and the \$75 million in Department of Defense drawdown already authorized, will bring total military assistance for the year to a level generally comparable to our original estimates of the need and our original request to the Congress.
- Third, to eliminate the \$377 million ceiling on our overall aid to Cambodia, or at least to exempt Public Law 480 food from that ceiling. This is necessary to enable us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, as soon as possible. The inability to use funds already included in the Department of Agriculture appropriation will cause a break in

the food supply pipeline beginning in June unless procurement action is begun by late March. New authority therefore is needed urgently. We anticipate, as we have throughout the year in appearances before you, that between \$73 million and \$100 million in additional rice and wheat will have to be provided to Cambodia this fiscal year. Economic collapse, and even starvation, may otherwise result.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, we wish, as do you, to see an early end to the suffering of the Cambodian people and to the destruction of their country. The only equitable way in which this can be accomplished is to strengthen conditions which will permit a negotiated solution to take place. It is for this purpose that additional military assistance and economic assistance authority for Cambodia is an urgent necessity.

This request—and the one we are submitting separately for Viet-Nam—does not represent the beginning of a new and open-ended commitment for the United States. Nor does it reflect any change in policy on the part of the United States. The additional funds and authorities which we are asking the Congress to make available for Cambodia are vitally needed, for the reasons I have set forth, in support of a policy which has in large measure proven appropriate to the difficult circumstances of Indochina. That policy, borne out in the record of our actions, is one of steady disengagement—in a manner designed to prevent new upheavals in Indochina, new instability in the East Asia region, and renewed contention among the major powers.

Cambodia cannot be considered separately from Viet-Nam and Laos, and the whole of Indochina cannot be isolated from larger world issues. The consequences of a decision to withhold vitally needed assistance to Cambodia would extend beyond the confines of Indochina—and they would be inimical to the broad sweep of our interests in this small and interdependent world. Such a decision would amount to a conscious act to abandon a small country to a forcible Communist takeover, an action without precedent in our history. The amounts we are requesting for Cambodia are not large when measured against the sacrifices we and the people of Indochina have already made. They are, however, vital to the restoration of conditions which can lead to peace in Cambodia.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF FY 1975 SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CAMBODIA

*Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency H.M. Fish,
Lt. Gen., USAF, before the Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations
Committee, February 3, 1975*

My colleague, Assistant Secretary Habib, has already addressed our objectives in Cambodia and the results of the lack of sufficient aid to the Cambodian Government. Let me review briefly the military situation and our present role in Cambodia.

In January 1973, the Khmer Communists mounted their first serious military effort. Their goal was the interdiction of all surface lines of communication to strangle Phnom Penh economically and force the fall of the government. That year the Khmer Communists committed 6,000-7,000 troops along the lower Mekong. They occupied portions of the river bank astride the strategic narrows controlling a sizable segment of the river southeast of Phnom Penh. These successes were short-lived. Thwarted by logistical inadequacies, command and control problems, and U.S. air support, the Khmer Communists soon drew back. While retaining the ability to periodically capture terrain, isolate Khmer Army positions, and harass river convoys, they failed in achieving their fundamental goal of forcing the collapse of the government.

During the second dry season offensive, the Communists gained in strength, corrected some of their more glaring deficiencies, and modified their tactics. The enemy continued to build their logistical bases without hindrance from U.S. air. But their efforts to defeat the Cambodian Armed Forces and to topple the government were unsuccessful.

This year's dry season offensive also started on January 1st with coordinated attacks in several sectors around Phnom Penh and along the length of the Mekong River. During the initial stages of this offensive, the Communists seized a number of isolated outposts and weakly defended villages around the perimeter of Phnom Penh. However, critical areas held; and the Communists were unable to penetrate the city's main defenses or to register further significant gains. By exploiting its superior fire power and mobility and the support of the Cambodian Air Force, the Khmer Armed Forces were able to recapture most of the territory lost earlier and secure the capital. In the process

the Communists suffered casualties of about 8,000 men. The Communists are using sophisticated mines, artillery, rockets, and mortar-type munitions in increasing amounts. The availability of these Chinese- and Soviet-supplied weapons allows the Khmer Communists to mount a significant challenge against convoys on the Mekong, as well as daily rocket attacks against civilian population centers.

Initially, the government did not have sufficient forces with which to defend simultaneously Phnom Penh and reinforce isolated outposts along the Mekong. By conducting determined and coordinated attacks against Phnom Penh's defenses which forced the commitment of forces to the capital's security, the insurgents were able to overrun a number of these isolated garrisons and gain control of long stretches of the river between Phnom Penh and the South Viet-Nam border.

In consolidating their tactical gains, Communist forces have dug in troops and heavy weapons to attack convoys which must run this gauntlet. Estimates are that the enemy has some 41 battalions committed to interdicting the Mekong, a clear indication of the importance the Communists attach to severing this critical supply line to Phnom Penh.

Once the government was able to stabilize the situation around the capital, it redirected major elements of its forces from around Phnom Penh to operations to clear the Mekong River. Reinforcements and additional supplies were rushed to Neak Luong, an important government control point on the Mekong River 35 miles southeast of the capital, which was under heavy attack. Riverine forces were committed in a number of amphibious operations to seize critical vantage points along the river captured earlier by enemy forces. In conjunction with the movement of supply ships and barges during the past week, the government has committed a large part of its army, navy, and air force in breaking the enemy's grip on the Mekong. This task is not expected to be easy and will extract a costly price in men, ammunition, and materiel; but the task will be accomplished, given U.S. logistic support. Ships are now getting through.

At the same time, Communist initiatives have also been directed at the provincial capitals of Kompong Cham and Siem Reap. Such actions do not signify a serious threat to these enclaves but are an effort to exploit vulnerabilities created by the current preoccupation of government units, to prevent government reinforcement in other

areas, and generally to keep government forces off balance.

Overall, the military prognosis for Cambodia is promising. As a fighting force, the Cambodian Armed Forces have given a good account of themselves. While the situation on the Mekong is extremely serious, the Cambodian Armed Forces appear capable of dealing with it, if given adequate logistic support. This is presently the most pressing weakness of the Cambodian Armed Forces. They are continually operating on a thin margin of logistic support. For instance, during the last few weeks enemy pressure has caused ammunition to be expended at an extremely high rate with a corresponding drawdown of in-country stocks. As of February 1st, the Cambodian Armed Forces in Phnom Penh had only a limited supply of ammunition. Similarly, rice and fuel have been reduced to dangerously low levels. In essence they must depend on outside support for survival and this is where U.S. assistance enters into the strategic equation. To avoid the collapse and chaos mentioned by Ambassador Habib, the United States has to provide this logistic support.

During the last few years, the Cambodian Armed Forces have undergone vast improvement; and although numerous weaknesses still remain, the outlook remains hopeful. Cambodia now fields a relatively modern, lightly-equipped army, a well-trained air force with effective combat aircraft and a modest lift capability, and an aggressive navy, consisting primarily of small riverine craft. Improved as they may be, however, the Cambodian Armed Forces have increasingly had to rely on the superiority of its U.S.-provided fire power and logistical system to offset Communist advantages of surprise and aggressiveness.

Which brings me to the U.S. role in Cambodia. Since military assistance was begun again in 1970, support has been limited both in what the United States can do and in the number of personnel with which the tasks can be accomplished. U.S. support has been logistical and of that, most has been in the form of combat consumables — and fuel. In essence, the Cambodian Government has been in the form of combat consumables — ammunition and fuel. In essence, the Cambodian Government has been provided the means required to defend themselves initially against experienced North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, and presently against determined Khmer Communists, still advised and equipped by the North Vietnamese

The military assistance balance sheet as of February 1st is as follows:

FY 75 Authorization to date	\$275 million
Obligations and charges	
under CRA against	
FY 75 Authorization	
(including drawdown)	\$260 million
 FY 75 Remaining	 15 million
Assets available:	
Remaining authority	\$15 million
Delivery pipeline	\$42 million
In-country stocks	\$29 million
 Total	 \$86 million

Costs at the current rate of intensive combat are averaging about \$1.5 million daily, of which about \$1.3 million is for ammunition. The remainder is for such items as spare parts, fuel, and medical supplies. If combat activity continues at this rate, Cambodia will start to run out of essential ammunition and other supplies completely in late March or early April. There will be no stock in-country or in the pipeline to sustain operations.

The President has requested \$222 million in additional military assistance for Cambodia to provide essential military supplies, primarily ammunition, that are needed to permit the Cambodians to maintain their ability to defend themselves. There is no cheaper or more viable alternative available. We do not seek to build up or reequip Cambodian Armed Forces; we seek only to keep them alive and fighting through the remainder of this fiscal year.

The request is composed of two basic elements. Ninety percent will be used for ammunition, POL [petroleum-oil-lubricants], spare parts, and other supplies needed to continue essential combat operations. The remaining 10 percent will be used to replace the most critical combat losses of equipment and provide items that are essential to maintaining supply lines. I will submit to the Committee a document which will detail how these funds are to be spent.

There is, I believe, only one conclusion to be drawn from the facts and figures. The arithmetic is as inescapable as the problem which confronts us. How we act upon that conclusion will determine the fate of Cambodia. Unless additional resources are made available, we shall be unable to provide the support that beleaguered nations must have to stave off a Communist military takeover. Without the funds we are requesting, we can only watch the inevitable course of events which I believe it is in

the national interest of the United States to prevent. Both that interest and the cause of world peace would be ill-served by the withdrawal of U.S. support because such withdrawal would not only lead to the loss of Cambodia, but also to the even more important loss of confidence on the part of other

allied and friendly nations in the validity of the U.S. commitment to international security. Such an outcome is clearly inconsistent with our own security and the foreign policy through which the United States seeks to obtain some of its most basic national objectives.

VIET-NAM: TWO YEARS AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT (EXCERPTS)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert H. Miller, at the World Affairs Council's Foreign Policy Conference in San Diego, California, January 23, 1975

Two years ago — January 27th — we signed a peace agreement to end the war in Viet-Nam.

... The peace terms in many ways were generous for all. For all parties the killing was to stop. We got our prisoners back and withdrew the remainder of our forces. South Viet-Nam was assured the right to settle its own internal problems without outside interference and to continue to receive outside assistance to permit it to rebuild and to defend itself. And North Viet-Nam was not required to recognize and withdraw its some 145,000 troops in the South The Provisional Revolutionary Government was also assured the right to participate in negotiating a solution to South Viet-Nam's internal problems, and to participate in national elections.

But, of course, the peace agreement had prohibitions too for all parties. All parties had to stop all their military activities in South Viet-Nam. For our part, we had to stop all our military activities in South Viet-Nam and against North Viet-Nam. We could not send our troops or advisers back into the South. The two South Vietnamese parties had to stop fighting and keep their forces in place. North Viet-Nam was proscribed from introducing one single soldier into the South and from using the territory of neighboring Laos and Cambodia, as well as the demilitarized zone, for hostile purposes against South Viet-Nam. Unfortunately, the peace has not been kept. . . .

... What has been happening in the past 2 years?

In essence what has happened is that North Viet-Nam has abandoned the negotiating table for the battlefield once again. It has been unable to achieve its unbending aim of dominating the South by political means—despite its forces in the South—and has abandoned all pretense of abiding by the solemn agreements it signed in favor of a return to the wheel of escalating violence.

It is charged that the South Vietnamese Government is at fault for the resurgence of fighting. Or that the United States is responsible for it. It is said that North Viet-Nam had to resume the fighting because South Viet-Nam and the United States are thwarting the negotiations for a political solution called for by the agreement. Even though, in the course of human affairs, nothing may ever be black or white, and even though the hatreds, suspicions, and mistrust run deep on both sides in Viet-Nam, the overwhelming proportions of responsibility for the present unfortunate state of affairs in South Viet-Nam lies with the massive, willful violation of the peace agreement by North Viet-Nam. There is no possible justification for North Viet-Nam's record of flagrant violation of the agreement they solemnly signed in Paris 2 years ago. In particular, the South Vietnamese Government has made numerous calls for the resumption of talks with the Provisional Revolutionary Government without any preconditions. These overtures have been met by persistent refusals and by unreasonable demands for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese Government as a precondition for resumption of the talks.

... South Viet-Nam has withstood with equanimity the traumatic impact of our withdrawal. Its forces have remained intact, as has its governmental structure. It is a going concern. It is defending itself well against the growing level of North Vietnamese attacks.

But when will South Viet-Nam be at peace? . . . It depends on a number of things, including decisions in Hanoi. But conditions change. Hanoi undoubtedly does not intend to give up its objective of dominating the South, but it has other pressing demands upon it for reconstruction in the North. South Viet-Nam, for its part, is a land of great potential. It has an industrious people, rich, fertile land, abundant natural resources; and it now appears to be on the verge of discovering important oil deposits.

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South Viet-Nam continues to need assistance from us. When the peace agreement was signed 2 years ago we were spending at the rate of \$7 billion per year. A year later we were spending at the rate of about \$1.8 billion. The trend line is down. There is no question of whether we will end our involvement in Viet-Nam; rather it is now a question of how and when. But today the current level of appropriations for military and economic aid for Viet-Nam is inadequate to South Viet-Nam's needs and to our own continuing responsibilities — especially in light of the escalated level of North Vietnamese attacks.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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